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Abstract
Consider an exchange mechanism which accepts “diversified” offers of various
commodities and redistributes everything it receives. We impose certain
conditions of fairness and convenience on such a mechanism and show that it
admits unique prices, which equalize the value of offers and returns for each
individual.
We next define the complexity of a mechanism in terms of certain inte-
gers τij , piij and ki that represent the time required to exchange i for j, the
difficulty in determining the exchange ratio, and the dimension of the mes-
sage space. We show that there are a finite number of minimally complex
mechanisms, in each of which all trade is conducted through markets for
commodity pairs.
Finally we consider minimal mechanisms with smallest worst-case com-
plexities τ = max τij and pi = max piij . For m > 3 commodities, there are
precisely three such mechanisms, one of which has a distinguished commod-
ity – the money – that serves as the sole medium of exchange. As m → ∞
the money mechanism is the only one with bounded (pi, τ).
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to show how simple criteria of fairness, conve-
nience and complexity can lead to the successive emergence of prices, mar-
kets, and money, in a Cournotian setting for commodity exchange. In the
process, we arrive at a rationale for money which is purely “mechanistic” in
spirit, and complements the existing utilitarian and behavioral literature on
the subject (see 1.1).
We consider abstract exchange mechanisms1, which accept “diversified”
offers of various commodities and redistribute everything, and further satisfy
five conditions, embodying fairness and convenience that we term Anonymity,
Aggregation, Invariance, Non-dissipation and Flexibility. Although there are
infinitely many such mechanisms, our first result is that each admits unique
prices2, which lead to value conservation, i.e. equalize the value of individual
offers and returns.
We next define some natural notions of “complexity” for a mechanism,
and, in keeping with the idea of convenience, study mechanisms with minimal
complexity. This leads to a finite class M∗ ⊂Mg, where Mg denotes certain
graphical mechanisms that are in one-to-one correspondence with directed,
connected graphs on the set of commodities. The directed edge ij may be
interpreted in M∗ as a market that provides traders the opportunity to offer
i in exchange for j. Prices not only conserve values in M∗ (in fact, in Mg)
but mediate trade in the sense that the return to a trader depends only on his
own offer and the prices. In short, prices “decouple” the interaction between
traders.
The emergence of prices and markets paves the way for the culmination
of the analysis, namely the emergence of money. To this end we introduce
additional refined criteria of complexity on M∗ and study the correspond-
ing minimal mechanisms, which we term strongly minimal. It turns out
that there are only three strongly minimal mechanisms, up to a relabeling
of commodities. In one of these, a single commodity emerges endogenously
1For us a Cournotian “mechanism” is a formal device that enables everyman to trade,
with the simple expedient of offering commodities and without having to account for his
precise motivation or even bothering to pretend that he has one. (See section 1.1.3.1 of [24]
for a spirited defence of the use of “mechanism” in this plain English meaning of the word.)
To forestall confusion, we emphasize that our usage is different from that of the recent
mechanism-design literature, where the word has acquired a specialized connotation.
2i.e., consistent exchange-rates across commodity pairs.
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as money and mediates trade among decentralized markets for the other
commodities. Moreover, with a moderate increase in the number of com-
modities, the money mechanism quickly supersedes the other two in a very
precise sense.
Finally let us mention that, while this paper is a companion to [9], the
two are meant to be readable independently. This has necessitated some
overlap but it is minimal. To be precise, the conditions on the mechanism
(with the exception of Flexibility) appear in [9], so does Proposition 5, and
the rest is disjoint.
1.1 Related Literature
The emergence of money as a medium of exchange has been a matter of
considerable discussion in economics. One approach, following Jevons [16],
has focused on search-theoretic models that involve repeated and random
bilateral meeting between agents (see, e.g., [2], [15], [17], [19], [20], [23], [26],
[42] and the references therein). Another line of inquiry is based on partial
or general equilibrium models with various kinds of frictions in trade, such as
transactions costs or limited trading opportunities (see, e.g., [10], [11], [12],
[13], [14], [27], [28], [40], [41], [43]). These models turn on notions of rational
expectations and utility-maximizing behavior of the agents in equilibrium.
In contrast, as was said, our analysis is based purely on the mechanism of
trade is and independent of the characteristics of the agents, such as their
endowments or utilities.
It is worth emphasizing that our analysis is quite agnostic regarding the
choice of any particular money3, being only at pains to point out the urgency
of appointing some money. For a discussion of different criteria entailed in the
choice of a suitable “commodity money” such as its portability, verifiability,
divisibility and durability; or, alternatively, the backing of the state requisite
to sustain “fiat money”, see, e,g., [1], [16], [18], [21], [22], [25], [34]; and,
for a recent survey on both kinds of money, see [39] and [40]. It would be
interesting to incorporate some of these criteria, as well as the utilitarian
considerations for money, into our mechanistic framework.
3Our model can equally accomodate fiat money or commodity money, depending on
how preferences are introduced. Indeed, all we suppose is that the m items being traded
are distinct from each other. In particular, offers and returns could just be quotes (think
of e-commerce!), instead of actual shipment of goods.
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This paper is intimately related to [9]. Let us briefly recount the model
there. We make the hypothesis in [9] that any offer of a commodity i speci-
fies some other commodity j which is being sought in exchange for i. Thus,
drawing a directed arc ij for every such offer permitted in the mechanism,
we obtain a (directed, connected4) graph G. There are infinitely many mech-
anisms for any given G, but it is shown in [9] that exactly one of them is
categorically determined by four of our five conditions, namely Anonymity,
Aggregation, Invariance, Non-dissipation (all except Flexibility). This is the
graphical “G-mechanism” mentioned earlier; so that the class Mg is precisely
the one generated as G varies over all directed, connected graphs on the fixed
node-set of commodities. Our refined complexity criteria apply equally toMg
as to its subset M∗, and we show that Mg has the same three strongly mini-
mal mechanisms as M∗. This is the main conclusion of [9] and it constitutes
a key step in the proof of the emergence of money in this paper.
Our current paper thus puts the analysis of [9] on a more general footing.
We start with a domain which is much richer than Mg, and which permits
traders to indulge in “cheap talk” in order to diversify their offers in any
commodity i. Furthermore, we allow for the possibility that these offers may
get complicated bundles of commodities in return. But Flexibility guarantees
that there exist special messages in the cheap talk through which a trader
can “unbundle” his return, i.e., messages that enable him to get only j in
exchange for i, whenever j is obtainable — albeit in conjunction with other
commodities — via an offer of i. Thus flexibility embeds a graph G, as a
sharply delineated language, within the tangle of cheap talk. We essentially
show that our complexity criteria cuts away the tangle, leaving behind only
the graphical G-mechanisms in M∗ ⊂ Mg. Thus we deduce the existence of
markets (i.e., the edges of the graph G) from an abstract standpoint, instead
of postulating them as in [9]. The exact structure of the subdomain M∗ of
Mg is not explored by us, as that would detract from the primary purpose
of this paper, which is to arrive expeditiously at the money mechanism.
The other precursor of this paper, at both the technical and conceptual
level, is [6], where a mechanism produces not only trades but also prices,
based upon everyone’s offers; and where price mediation is postulated as a
condition. The main result of [6] is that Mg is characterized by Anonymity,
Aggregation, Invariance, Price Mediation and Accessibility (the last repre-
4connected, because we require that it should be possible to convert any commodity to
another by iterated trading.
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senting a weak form of continuity). In contrast, here we deduce the existence
of prices, as well as their crucial role in mediating trade, based on consider-
ations of a different sort, as outlined in the introduction and formalized in
section 4 below. Moreover, the analysis in [6] stopped at the characterization
of Mg and did not delve into any further selection among the mechanisms.
2 Exchange Mechanisms
Definition 1 A pre-mechanism consists of the following data:
1. a commodity space C = Rm+ ;
2. an action space S = RK+ where K = K1 ∐ · · · ∐Km is a finite set;
3. for each integer n ≥ 1, a return map ρn : S (n)→ Cn where
S (n) =
{(
a1, . . . , an
)
∈ Sn : a1 + · · ·+ an ∈ S+
}
, S+ = R
K
++. (1)
We refer to the elements of Ki as i-indices, and for a ∈ S we define a ∈ C
by summing over the various i-indices for each i; thus we have
a = (α1, . . . , αm) where αi =
∑
h∈Ki
ah.
Definition 2 An exchange mechanism is a pre-mechanism which satisfies:
if
(
r1, . . . , rn
)
= ρn
(
a1, . . . , an
)
then r1 + · · ·+ rn = a1 + · · ·+ an. (2)
The interpretation is as follows. There is an underlying set {1, . . . , m} of
commodities5, and for each i-index h ∈ Ki, the component ah of an action
a represents an offer of commodity i. Thus we also refer to a as an offer,
and the various i-indices serve to “diversify” the offer in i. An exchange
mechanism enables trade as follows: having received n offers (a1, . . . , an),
which are “positive on the aggregate” (1), it redistributes the commodities
according to ρn. Condition (2) means that commodities are conserved.
As mentioned already in section 1.1, one possible interpretation of the
indices is as a common language in which traders may communicate with
the mechanism M . The language is completely abstract: no structure is
5It will always be clear from the context whether i is the name of a commodity, or that
of an individual, or just an integer.
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imposed on it except that it be of finite size. The elements of Ki may be
thought of as costless messages (“cheap talk”) that accompany offers in i.
Another interpretation of Ki could be that it represents different times (or,
places) when (or, where) the offer of i is sent. The reader can no doubt
think of still more interpretations. It is to make room for all these that we
have used the neutral term “index”. However, in the context of graphical
mechanisms which emerge out of our analysis (see section 4), it turns out
that i-indices have a concrete economic interpretation as certain commodity
pairs ij, representing “markets” where i can be exchanged for j.
2.1 Conditions on the Mechanisms
In order to describe our conditions, we need some notation. We first define
scaling actions of λ ∈ Rm++ on r ∈ C and a ∈ S via
(λ ∗ r)i = λiri for all i, (λ ∗ a)h = λiah for all h ∈ Ki.
Let ρ : S (2) → C denote the first component of the two trader return
function ρ2. If h ∈ Ki is an i-index then the unit vector eh ∈ S is an offer in
commodity i alone. The j-th component ρj (eh, a) of ρ (eh, a) is the return of
commodity j to trader 1, when he offers eh and the other offers a.
Definition 3 We say h ∈ Ki is an ij-index if for some a we have
ρj (eh, a) > 0.
We say an ij-index h is pure if for all a we have
ρk (eh, a) = 0 for all k 6= j.
Our five conditions on an exchange mechanism, termed Anonymity, Ag-
gregation, Invariance, Non-dissipation, and Flexibility, are as follows.
Condition 4 If ρn (a1, . . . , an) = (r1, . . . , rn) then we have
1. ρn
(
aσ(1), . . . , aσ(n)
)
=
(
rσ(1), . . . , rσ(n)
)
for any permutation σ.
2. ρn−1 (a1, . . . , an−2, an−1 + an) = (r1, . . . , rn−2, rn−1 + rn).
3. ρn (λ ∗ a1, . . . , λ ∗ an) = (λ ∗ r1, . . . , λ ∗ rn) for all λ ∈ Rm++.
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4. For each i, ri − ai is either 0 or it has a strictly positive component.
5. For all ij, if there is an ij-index then there is a pure ij-index.
For such a mechanism M, by Anonymity and Aggregation we have
ρn
(
a1, . . . , an
)
=
(
ρ
(
a1, a−1
)
, . . . , ρ
(
an, a−n
))
where a−i = a1+· · ·+an−ai.
Thus M is uniquely determined by ρ, and also by the trade and net trade
functions, which are defined as follows:
r (a, b) = ρ (a, b− a) , ν (a, b) = r (a, b)− a¯.
These latter functions have domain {(a, b) ∈ S × S+ : a ≤ b}.
Proposition 5 ν admits a unique extension to S × S+ satisfying
ν (ta, b) = tν (a, b) , ν (a, tb) = ν (a, b) for all t > 0.
Proof. See Lemma 1 of [6]. Although [6] considers a more restrictive
class of mechanisms, we note that the proof of Lemma 1 there only uses
Anonymity, Aggregation, and Invariance.
In view of the above result, we will drop the restriction a ≤ b for ν (a, b).
2.2 Comments on the Conditions
The first condition is Anonymity; it stipulates that the mechanism be blind
to all characteristics of a trader other than his offer. The second condition is
Aggregation, it asserts that if any trader pretends to be two different persons
by splitting his offer, the returns to the others is unaffected. Aggregation
does not imply that if two individuals were to merge, they would be unable
to enhance their “oligopolistic power”. For despite the aggregation condition,
the merged individuals are free to coordinate their actions by jointly picking
a point in the Cartesian product of their action spaces. Indeed all the mech-
anisms we obtain display this “oligopolistic effect”, even though they also
satisfy Aggregation. The two conditions embody fairness, enabling free entry
for any new participant on non-discriminatory terms, and thereby making
the mechanism more “inclusive”. They also contribute to convenience, if
either of these conditions were violated, trade would become a cumbersome
affair: each individual would need to keep track of the full distribution of
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offers across the entire population, and then figure out how to diversify his
own offers in response.
The third condition is Invariance; its main content is that the maps ρn
which comprise the mechanism are invariant under a change of units in which
commodities are measured. This makes the mechanism much simpler to op-
erate in: one does not need to keep track of seven pounds or seven kilograms
or seven tons, just the numeral 7 will do. It is worthy of note that the
cuneiform tablets of ancient Sumeria, which are some of the earliest exam-
ples of written language and arithmetic, are in large part devoted to records
and receipts pertaining to economic transactions. Invariance postulates the
”numericity” property of the ρn making them independent of the underlying
choice of units, and this goes to the very heart of the quantitative measure-
ment of commodities. In its absence, one would need to figure out how the
maps are altered when units change, as they are prone to do, especially in a
dynamic economy. This would make the mechanism cumbersome to use.
The fourth condition is Non-dissipation; it says that no trader’s return
can be less commodity-wise than his offer. If it were violated, such unfortu-
nate traders would find it grossly unfair and tend to abandon the mechanism.
In conjunction with Aggregation, Anonymity, and the conservation of com-
modities, this immediately implies no-arbitrage:
for any a, b neither ν(a, b)  0 nor ν(a, b)   0.
To see this, note that in view of Proposition 5 we need consider only the case
a ≤ b and rule out ν(a, b)  0. Denote c = b− a. Then
ν(a, b) + ν(c, b) = ν(a + c, b) = ν(b, b) = 0,
where the first equality follows from Aggregation, and the last from conserva-
tion of commodities. But then ν(a, b)  0 implies ν(c, b)   0, contradicting
Non-dissipation.
The fifth and final condition is Flexibility, it reflects the perspective of
a trader who wishes to interact with the mechanism to exchange a single
commodity i for some other commodity j. If h is an ij-index then we have
ρj (eh, a) > 0, which means that the trader can get a positive amount of
commodity j for a suitable offer by the other(s). However if there is no
pure ij-index then the trader may be forced to accept commodity j bundled
with other commodities. Flexibility guarantees that there are “enough” pure
indices to enable individuals to “unbundle” their returns. The mechanism
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may well admit complex trading opportunities, such as swaps of commodity
bundles, that coexist with these indices; the former comprising, so to speak,
a tangled web around the latter. It is our complexity criteria below which
eliminate the web and allow only the pure ij-indices to survive (as markets
of i for j), see Theorem 12.
3 Complexity
We now discuss three notions of complexity for a mechanism M . The first,
and simplest, is
ki = ki(M) = |Ki(M)|
which is the dimension of the offer space for commodity i, and which we refer
to as the i-index complexity.
The next two notions are defined from standpoint of a “binary” ij-trader6
who interfaces with M in order to exchange commodity i for exclusively
commodity j. We focus on two basic concerns for such a trader: first, how
long will it take him to effect the exchange; and, second, how difficult will it
be for him to figure out the terms of exchange? The first concern leads to the
notion of “time complexity”, and the second to that of “price complexity”.
We fix some notation; let ei denote the i-th unit vector.
Definition 6 A vector v is an i-vector if v = sei for some real number s > 0;
and an ı¯j-vector if v = −sei + tej for some real s, t > 0.
3.1 Time Complexity
Definition 7 Given two commodity bundles v, w ∈ C we will say that v can
be converted to w, and we write v → w if there exist a, b such that
w = v + ν(a, b) and a ≤ v.
6We focus on bilateral trades between pairs of commodities because they form an
iterative basis for all trade. This is so on account of prices (exchange rates) that will
shortly be shown to emerge and govern all trade.
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Let τ (v, w,M) denote the smallest “time” t for which there is a sequence7
v → v1 → · · · → vt−1 → w.
We define the ij-time complexity and (maximum) time complexity as follows8
τij (M) := τ (ei, ej ,M) , τ(M) := maxi 6=j {τij(M)} .
We say that a mechanism M is connected if τ(M) <∞.
Definition 8 M(m) is the class of all connected mechanisms with commod-
ity set {1, . . . , m}, that satisfy Anonymity, Aggregation, Invariance, Non-
dissipation and Flexibility.
When the commodity set {1, . . . , m} is understood, we shall often sup-
press m and write M = M(m).
3.2 The Emergence of Prices
Let Rm++/ ∼ be the set of rays in R
m
++, representing prices
9. It turns out that
prices10 emerge in connected mechanisms; and the values, under these prices,
of offers and returns are conserved for every trader.
Theorem 9 Let M ∈ M with associated net trade function ν. Then there
is a unique map p : RK++ → R
m
++/ ∼ satisfying value conservation
11: p(b) ·
ν(a, b) = 0.
7Notice that at the moment we permit the market state to vary across the t transitions
of the sequence v → v1 → · · · → vt−1 → w. But even if we were to restrict attention to the
case in which the same b ∈ S+ should represent the market state across all transitions,
the time complexity would of M will remain unaffected. This follows from Lemma 15
8It follows by Invariance that in the definition one can replace the unit vectors ei, ej
by arbitrary i- and j- vectors.
9A ray p represents a price vector up to overall multiplication by a positive scalar;
the ratios pi/pj represent well-defined consistent exchange rates across all pairs ij of
commodities.
10Our analysis remains intact if there is a continuum of traders (see Section 7 of [9]).
In this case, an individual’s action has no effect on the exchange rate. Otherwise it affects
the aggregate offer (i.e., the state of the market) and thereby the exchange rate, which is
but to be expected in an oligopolistic framework.
11Note that value conservation is perforce true on the aggregate since commodities are
neither created nor destroyed by the mechanism, only redistributed. What is shown here
is that it holds at the individual level, i.e., the mechanism does not assign “profitable”
trades to some at the expense of others.
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Even though p(b) is only defined up to an overall scalar multiple, for each
pair i, j we get a well-defined price ratio function
pij : S+ 7→ R++; pij(b) =
pi(b)
pj(b)
Theorem 9 has the following immediate consequence.
Corollary 10 Suppose ν(a, b) is an ı¯j-vector. Then νi(a,b)
νj(a,b)
= −pij(b).
3.3 Price Complexity
Note that a binary ij-trader is only interested in net trades ν(a, b) that are
ı¯j-vectors. By the previous corollary, the exchange ratio νi(a,b)
νj(a,b)
is independent
of the action a producing the ı¯j-trade, and depends only on pij(b). Therefore
such a trader is interested only in those components of b which “influence”
the function pij(b).
To make this notion precise, say that component i is influential for a
function f(x1, . . . , xl) if there are two inputs x, x
′, differing only in the ith
place, such that f (x) 6= f (x′). Define the ij-price complexity piij(M) to
be the number of influential components of the function pij . Also define the
(maximum) price complexity by
pi(M) := max {piij(M) : i 6= j}
4 The Emergence of Markets: G-Mechanisms
4.1 Directed Graphs
In this paper by a graph we mean a directed simple graph. Such a graph G
consists of a finite vertex set VG, togther with an edge set EG ⊆ VG × VG
that does not contain any loops, i.e., edges of the form ii. For simplicity we
shall often write i ∈ G, ij ∈ G in place of i ∈ VG, ij ∈ EG but there should
be no confusion.
By a path ii1i2 . . . ikj from i to j we mean a nonempty sequence of edges
in G of the form
ii1, i1i2, . . . , ik−1ik, ikj.
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If k = 0 then the path consists of the single edge ij, otherwise we insist that
the intermediate vertices i1, . . . , ik be distinct from each other and from the
endpoints i, j. However we do allow i = j, in which case the path is called
a cycle. We say that G is connected if for any two vertices i 6= j there is a
path from i to j.
4.2 G-mechanisms
Let G be a connected graph with vertex set {1, . . . , m}. Following [6] one
may associate to G a mechanism MG ∈ M = M(m) as follows. We let Ki
be the set of outgoing edges at vertex i, and regard v ∈ S as a matrix (vij)
with vij understood to be 0 if ij /∈ G. To define r (a, b) we need the following
elementary result (see, e.g. [6]).
Lemma 11 For b ∈ S+, there is a unique ray p = p(b) in Rm++/ ∼ satisfying
∑
i
pibij =
∑
i
pjbji for all j. (3)
Now for (a, b) ∈ S × S+ we set p = p (b) as in (3) and define r (a, b) by
ri(a, b) = p
−1
i
(∑
j
pjaji
)
for all i. (4)
We remark that the left side of (3) is the total value of all the goods “chasing”
good j, while the right side is the total value of good j on offer.
Mechanisms of the form MG will be called (connected) G-mechanisms,
and we write Mg = Mg(m) for the totality of such mechanisms. It is worth
noting that Mg is a finite set. Moreover, the formula (4) for the return
function of a G-mechanism immediately implies
p(b) = p(c) =⇒ r(a, b) = r(a, c) for all a ∈ S; b, c ∈ S+ (5)
In [6] this property was referred to as price mediation and, in conjunction
with other axioms, shown to characterize Mg.
To sum up, these graphical G-mechanisms have very special structure.
All the indices are pure, i.e. each edge ij of G represents a pure ij-index and
can be interpreted as a market to exchange i for j; furthermore, as we just
saw, prices mediate trade in MG in the following strong sense: the return
to a trader depends only on his own offer and the prices12((see equation
12Price mediation in fact follows from value conservation once all indices are pure.
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(5)). Thus prices play the full-fledged role of a “decoupling device” in any
G-mechanism.
It is worth emphasizing that the markets of G-mechanisms are, in general,
not decentralized in that the exchange rate pi/pj may depend on offers of
commodities other than i and j, at various edges in the graph.
4.3 Minimal Mechanisms
Given M and M ′ in M = M(m) with complexities τij , piij , ki and τ
′
ij, pi
′
ij , k
′
i
respectively, we say that M is no more complex than M ′ and write M  M ′
if for all i, j
τij ≤ τ
′
ij , piij ≤ pi
′
ij, ki ≤ k
′
i.
Clearly  is reflexive and transitive, and hence constitutes a quasiorder on
M. We let M∗ = M∗(m) denote the set of -minimal elements of M.
Theorem 12 Minimal mechanisms are G-mechanisms: M∗ ⊂Mg.
5 The Emergence of Money
Let us, from now on, identify two mechanisms if one can be obtained from
the other by relabeling commodities. There are three mechanisms of special
interest to us in Mg(m) called the star, cycle, and complete mechanisms;
with the following edge-sets:
G Star Cycle Complete
EG {mi, im : i < m} {12, 23, . . . , m1} {ij : i 6= j}
Notice that the central vertex m of the graph underlying the star mechanism
plays the role of money, and is the sole medium of exchange13.
Although the set M∗ is finite, it can be quite large and we will not at-
tempt to characterize it here. Instead we consider the “worst-case complexi-
ties” pi (M) = max piij (M) and τ (M) = max τij (M), and the corresponding
quasiorder on M, namely: M w M
′ if
τ(M) ≤ τ(M ′), pi(M) ≤ pi(M ′).
13This is reminiscent of “spontaneous symmetry breaking” in physics. The ex ante
symmetry between commodities, assumed in our model, is carried over to the cycle and
complete mechanisms. It breaks down only in the star mechanism, giving rise to money.
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If M˜ is a subset of M one can consider the minimal elements of M˜ with
respect to the quasiorder wrestricted to M˜; these will be referred to as
strongly minimal mechanisms of M˜.
Theorem 13 If m > 3 then the three special mechanisms are precisely the
strongly minimal mechanisms of both M∗ (m) and Mg (m). Their complexi-
ties are
Star Cycle Complete
pi(M) 4 2 m(m− 1)
τ(M) 2 m− 1 1
The array clearly exhibits the superiority of the star mechanism. As the
number of commodities m increases, the other two will beat star slightly in
one component, but will lose by a huge margin to star in the other component,
with the upshot that the star is the overall winner:
Theorem 14 For any strictly positive λ and µ, there exists m0 such that the
star mechanism is the unique maximizer of λpi(M) + µτ(M) on M∗ (m) and
on Mg (m) whenever m ≥ m0.
In the star mechanism14, the pair of edges im,mi constitutes a bilateral
market between i and m for all i 6= m. Thus the central node m plays the
role of money, mediating trade between various markets. Furthermore these
markets are decentralized in that the trade at any market is independent of
the offers at all other markets.
6 Proof of Theorem 9
We fix a mechanism M in M with net trade function ν (a, b). Consider the
set of pairs (i, j) for which there is at least one pure ij-index in K, and fix
a subset P ⊂ K which contains exactly one ij-index for each such pair. Let
SP ⊂ S denote the set of P -offers, i.e. those a satisfying ah = 0 for h /∈ P ,
and further define the set of P -offers “subordinate” to v as follows:
SP (v) = {a ∈ SP : a ≤ v}
14The star mechanism (also known as the “Shapley-Shubik mechanism”, see [35], [36],
[37]) has been much-studied in the literature in different contexts, see, e.g., [3], [4], [5], [7],
[8], [29], [30], [31], , [39], [38], [39], [40]. The complete mechanism (also known as “Shapley’s
windows mechanism”) is analysed in [33]. All other G-mechanisms are discussed in [6].
14
Given a vector v ∈ S we write 〈v〉 for the class of vectors with the same sign
as v, thus w ∈ 〈v〉 if each component wi has the same sign (+,−, 0) as vi.
Lemma 15 Let v, w ∈ S then the following are equivalent.
1. There is an a ∈ SP (v) such that v + ν (a, b) ∈ 〈w〉 for some b ∈ S+
2. There is an a ∈ SP (v) such that v + ν (a, b) ∈ 〈w〉 for all b ∈ S+
3. For each u ∈ 〈v〉 there is an a ∈ SP (u) such that u+ ν (a, b) ∈ 〈w〉 for
all b ∈ S+
Proof. It is evident that (3) implies (2), and (2) implies (1). We now
show that (1) implies (3). Suppose v, a, b, w satisfy (1). Given u ∈ 〈v〉 and
b∗ ∈ S+, we need to find a∗ ∈ SP (u) such that u, a∗, b∗, w satisfy (3). Since u
and v have the same signs there exist positive scalars λi such that ui = λivi
for all i. Define a∗ by (a∗)i = λiai, where (recall) ai is the vector obtained
from a by restricting to the Ki-components. Now we have
v + ν (a, b) = (v − a) + r (a, b)
u+ ν (a∗, b∗) = (u− a∗) + r (a∗, b∗)
By construction of a∗ we have (v − a)i = λi (u− a∗)i for all i, and hence
〈v − a〉 = 〈u− a∗〉. Also since a and a∗ are P -offers, by Aggregation and
Invariance we have 〈r (a, b)〉 = 〈r (a, b∗)〉 = 〈r (a∗, b∗)〉. We note that if x, y
are non-negative vectors then 〈x+ y〉 is uniquely determined by 〈x〉 and 〈y〉,
thus we get
〈u+ ν (a∗, b∗)〉 = 〈v + ν (a, b)〉 = 〈w〉
which establishes (3).
We note that Lemma 15 (3) only depends on 〈v〉 and 〈w〉 and we will
write 〈v〉 → 〈w〉 if it holds.
Lemma 16 For any (a, b) ∈ S × S+ there is a∗ ∈ SP (a) such that
〈r (a, b)〉 = 〈a + ν (a∗, b)〉 . (6)
Proof. By Aggregation, it suffices to prove this when a is a Ki-offer for
some i. By Flexibility there is some a∗ ∈ SP (a) such that ri (a∗, b) = 0, while
rj (a∗, b) has the same sign as rj (a, b) for all j 6= i. We write
a+ ν (a∗, b) = (a− a∗) + r (a∗, b)
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and note that since a∗ is a pure Ki-offer, the sign of r (a∗, b) does not change
if we rescale a∗. If ri (a, b) = 0 we scale up a∗ to ensure a∗ = a, while if
rj (a, b) > 0 then we scale down a∗ to ensure a∗   a; in each case the rescaled
a∗ satisfies (6).
Lemma 17 v1 → · · · → vt implies 〈v1〉 → · · · → 〈vt〉.
Proof. It suffices to show that v → w implies 〈v〉 → 〈w〉. Now by
definition
w = v + ν (a, b) for some (a, b) ∈ S × S+ with a ≤ v.
If a∗ is as in (6) then the identities
v + ν (a∗, b) = (v − a) + (a+ ν (a∗, b))
v + ν (a, b) = (v − a) + r (a, b)
imply 〈v + ν (a∗, b)〉 = 〈w〉, whence 〈v〉 → 〈w〉 by Lemma 15 (1).
Proposition 18 For b ∈ S+ and any i 6= j there is a ∈ SP such that ν(a, b)
is an ı¯j-vector.
Proof. Let v be an i-vector and let t = τij (M) then by definition we
have a sequence
v → v1 → · · · → vt−1 = w
where w is a j-vector. By the previous lemma we get
〈v〉 →
〈
v1
〉
→ · · · →
〈
vt−1
〉
→ 〈w〉
By Lemma 15 (3) this means we can find sequences
ui ∈
〈
vi
〉
, ai ∈ SP
(
ui
)
for i = 0, . . . , t− 1
such that ui + ν (ai, b) = ui+1. If a =
∑
ai then we have a ∈ SP and
ν (a, b) =
∑
ν
(
ai, b
)
= ut − u1
which is an ı¯j-vector.
It will be convenient to write an ı¯j-vector in the form (−x, y) after sup-
pressing the other components. In the context of the above proposition if
ν (a, b) = (−x, y) then by linearity ν (a/x, b) = (−1, y/x), and we will say
that the offer a (or a/x) achieves an ij-exchange ratio of y/x at b.
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Lemma 19 If a′, a′′achieve ij-exchange ratios α′, α′′ at b, then α′ = α′′.
Proof. By the previous proposition there exists an a such that ν (a, b) is
a j¯i-vector; if α is the corresponding exchange ratio then by rescaling a, a′, a′′
we may assume that
ν (a, b) = (1,−α) , ν (a′, b) = (−1, α′) , ν (a′′, b) = (−1, α′′) .
By Proposition 5 we get
ν (a+ a′, b) = (0, α− α′)
Now by Non-dissipation we get α ≥ α′, and exchanging the roles of i and j
we conclude that α′ ≥ α and hence that α = α′. Arguing similarly we get
α = α′′ and hence that α′ = α′′.
Proof of Theorem 9. Fix b ∈ S+ and consider the vector
p = (1, p2, . . . , pm)
where p−1j is the 1j-exchange ratio at b, as in the previous lemma. We will
show that p satisfies the conditions of Theorem 9, i.e. that
p · ν (a, b) = 0 for all a. (7)
We argue by induction on the number d (a, b) of non-zero components of
ν (a, b) in positions 2, . . . , m. If d (a, b) = 0 then ν (a, b) = 0 by Non-
dissipation and (7) is obvious. If d (a, b) = 1 then ν (a, b) is either an 1¯j-
vector or a j¯1 vector, which by the definition of pj and the previous lemma
is necessarily of the form
(
−x, xp−1j
)
or
(
x,−xp−1j
)
;
for such vectors (7) is immediate. Now suppose d (a, b) = d > 1 and fix j
such that νj (a, b) 6= 0. Then we can choose a
′ such that ν (a′, b) is a 1¯j or
a j¯1- vector such that νj (a, b) = −νj (a
′, b) . It follows that d (a + a′, b) < d
and by linearity we get
p · ν (a, b) = p · ν (a + a′, b)− p · ν (a′, b) .
By the inductive hypothesis the right side is zero, hence so is the left side.
Finally the uniqueness of the price function is obvious, because the return
function of the mechanism dictates how many units of j may be obtained for
one unit of i, yielding just one possible candidate for the exchange rate for
every pair ij.
17
7 Proof of Theorem 12
We say a matrix X is an S×T matrix if its rows and columns are indexed by
finite sets S and T respectively; if Y is a T ×U matrix then the product XY
is a well-defined S × U matrix. For the set [n] = {1, . . . , n} we will speak of
n× T matrices instead of [n]× T matrices, etc.
LetM ∈M(m) and write Ki = Ki (M) and K =
∐
iKi as usual. For any
vector v ∈ Rm++, let Dv denote the m×m diagonal matrix diag{v1, . . . , vm} ,
and let Ev denote the K×K “extended” diagonal matrix whose Ki-diagonal
entries are all vi. Also let A be the m × K “auxiliary” matrix whose K1-
columns are (1, 0, . . . , 0)t, K2-columns are (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)
t, etc.
Lemma 20 M is uniquely determined by a map b 7→ Nb from S+ to the
space of non-negative m×K column-stochastic matrices as follows.
1. The price ray p = p(b) is obtained as the unique solution of
Cbp = ∆bp (8)
where ∆b = ADbA
t is the diagonal matrix of column sums of Cb =
NbDbA
t
2. The return function is given by
r (a, b) = Mba where Mb = D
−1
p NbEp (9)
Proof. Let p = p(b) be the price function whose existence is guaranteed
by Theorem 9. We will first prove formula 9 for r(a, b) and then prove formula
8. By Proposition 5, the return function of the mechanism M is of the form
r (a, b) = Mba, where b 7→Mb is a map from S+ to the space of non-negative
m× k matrices satisfying
Mbb = Ab
and the identity
MEvb = DvMbE
−1
v for all v ∈ R
m
++. (10)
(The non-negativity Mb follows from that of r (a, b). The first display holds
by conservation of commodities and the second by Invariance.) Define
b′ = Epb, Nb = Mb′ .
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By Invariance it follows that p(b′) = 1. Also each column of Nb =Mb′ is the
return to the offer of a single unit in some commodity. Since all prices are 1
at b′, Theorem 9 implies that each column of Nb sums to 1, i.e. Nb is column
stochastic. Now by (10) we get
Nb =MEpb = DpMbE
−1
p ,
whence Mb = D
−1
p NbEp as desired
Now combining (9) andMbb = Ab, with the identity DpA = AEp we have
NbEpb = DpMbb = DpAb = AEpb.
Using the identity Epb = DbA
tp we can rewrite this as
NbDbA
tp = ADpA
tb,
which is precisely (8).
Lemma 21 Let Nb in Lemma 20 and let h ∈ Ki be a pure ij-index.
1. The h-th column of Nb is the j-th unit vector ej, independent of b.
2. EveryKi-column of Nb is a linear combination of the “pure”Ki-columns.
Proof. By definition there is an h-offer a such that r (a, b) = Mba is a
j-return vector. This means that the h-th column ofMb has a non-zero entry
only in its j-th component. Since Nb is obtained fromMb by rescaling entries
this is also true of Nb. By column stochasticity the h-th column of Nb must
be ej.
For the second part, let h′ ∈ Ki be an i-index, let v, w be the h
′-th
columns of Nb and Mb, and suppose the j-th component of v (and hence of
w) is non-zero. It suffices to show that in this case the mechanism has a pure
ij-index. However if a is an h′-offer then r (a, b) = Mba is a multiple of w,
and thus the assertion follows from Flexibility.
Let G be the graph in which we connect i to j if M has a pure ij-index.
Since M is connected, Lemma 17 implies that G is connected, and we let
M ′ = MG denote the corresponding G-mechanism. We will identify the i-
indices K ′i of M
′ as a subset of Ki. If M has several pure ij-indices for a
given j then this involves a choice, however the choice will play no role in the
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subsequent discussion. We will refer to M ′ as the embedded G-mechanism
of M .
To continue we need a result from [32]. Let G be any connected directed
graph on {1, . . . , n} with weights zij attached to edges ij ∈ G. We write
Z = (zij) for the n×n matrix of edge weights of G, setting zij = 0 if ij /∈ G.
We also define
δj =
∑
izij , ∆Z = diag (δ1, . . . , δn) ,
so that ∆ is the diagonal matrix of column sums of Z. We define the weight
of a subgraph Γ to be the product of its edge weights, thus
wΓ (z) =
∏
ij∈EΓ
zij .
We define an i-tree in G to be a (directed) subgraph T with n vertices and
n− 1 edges, and the futher property that T contains a path from j to i for
every j 6= i. We write Ti for the set of i-trees in G, and define
wi =
∑
Γ∈Ti
wΓ (z) , w = (w1, . . . , wn)
t .
The following lemma from [32] is critical and paves the way for the rest of
the analysis.
Lemma 22 If Z,∆Z , w are as above then one has Zw = ∆Zw.
We can now prove a key property of embedded G-mechanisms.
Proposition 23 If a price ratio depends on some variable in M ′, then it
does so in M .
Proof. The pure columns of Nb are fixed unit vectors, independent of
b. By assumption there is a bijection between the pure variables and the
nonzero entries crs (b) of the matrix Cb. We denote the pure components of
b by x = (xrs) and the remaining mixed components by y = (yk). Then by
the definition of Cb we have an expression of the form
crs (b) = xrs +
∑
k
εk (b) yk; 0 ≤ εk (b) ≤ 1. (11)
By formula (8) and Lemma 22, the prices p in M and M ′ are weighted sums
of trees with edge weights crs and xrs repectively. Let p (x, y) denote the
20
price vector in M at b = (x, y) and let p (x) denote the price vector in M ′ at
x. Then by (11) we get
p (x) = lim
y→0
p (x, y) .
We now fix a pair of commodities i, j and let pi (x, y) and pi (x) denote
the price ratios pi/pj in M and M
′ respectively, then we have
pi (x) = lim
y→0
pi (x, y) .
Thus if pi (x) depends on some x-component, so must pi (x, y).
Proof of Theorem 12. By lemma 17, lemma 21 and the previous
proposition (respectively), we have:
τij (M
′) = τij (M) , k (M
′) ≤ k (M) , piij (M
′) ≤ piij (M)
If M is minimal then equality must hold throughout. Hence we get k (M ′) =
k (M) and so M =M ′ is a G-mechanism..
8 Proof of Theorem 13
First let us recall some basic order-theoretic notions.
Definition 24 A quasiorder - on a set X is a binary relation that is reflex-
ive (x - x) and transitive:
x - y, y - z =⇒ x - z.
We write x ≺ y if x - y holds but y - x does not hold. We say that x is
--minimal if there is no y in X such y ≺ x, equivalently if for all y ∈ X
y - x =⇒ x - y.
We write X≺ for the set of --minimal elements of X. We say that - is
a well-quasiorder (wqo) if there does not exist an infinite descending chain
· · · ≺ xn ≺ · · · ≺ x2 ≺ x1.
Note that if - is a wqo on X and Y ⊂ X then the restriction of - defines
a wqo on Y . In general the minimal elements Y≺ can be quite different from
X≺, however we have the following elementary result.
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Lemma 25 If (X,-) is a wqo and X≺ ⊂ Y ⊂ X then X≺ = Y≺.
Proof. Any minimal element of X that happens to lie in Y is clearly
minimal in Y . Thus X∗ ⊂ Y implies X≺ ⊂ Y≺. On the other hand if z is a
non-minimal element of X then x ≺ z for some x ∈ X≺, otherwise we could
construct an infinite descending chain in X starting with z. In particular
any z ∈ Y \X≺ satisfies x ≺ z for some x ∈ X≺ ⊂ Y , hence z is not minimal
in Y.
It is easy to check that both the quasiorders  and w that we have
introduced on M are wqo’s; and therefore in the proof below we will apply
the previous lemma to them.
Proof of Theorem 13. Let S denote the set consisting of the three
special mechanisms. We need to show that (Mg)≺w = S and (M∗)≺w = S.
It is shown in [9] that (Mg)≺w = S.
We now prove (M∗)≺w = S. Since (Mg)≺w = S, by Lemma 25 applied
to the wqo wit suffices to show that S ⊂M∗. We further note that
M∗ = (Mg)≺ . (12)
Indeed M∗ = M≺ by definition, and M∗ ⊂ Mg by Theorem 12; now (12)
follows from Lemma 25 applied to the wqo . Thus it suffices to prove that
S ⊂ (Mg)≺ (13)
i.e., that each of the three special mechanisms is -minimal in Mg.
The -minimality is obvious for the complete graph since any other graph
would have some τij > 1, and also for the cycle since any other graph would
have some ki > 1. To establish -minimality for the star graph, it suffices
to show that any non-star graph G has either some piij ≥ 5 or some τij ≥ 3.
For this we note that pi ≥ 5 holds by Theorem 16 of [9] if G is not a rose or
a chorded cycle; while τ ≥ 3 holds trivially for non-star roses and by Lemma
37 of [9] for chorded cycles. This completes the proof of (13) and hence of
(M∗)≺w = S.
Remark 26 For m = 3, Lemma 37 of [9] does not hold and we have an ad-
ditional strongly minimal mechanism with (τ, pi) = (2, 4), namely the chorded
triangle
·
↓ տ
· ⇆ ·
22
References
[1] Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations, London: Muethen & Co., Ltd, 5th edition, 1904.
[2] Bannerjee, A.V. and E. Maskin (1996). A Walrasian theory of money
and barter, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(4): 955-1005.
[3] Dubey, P. and M. Shubik (1978). The noncooperative equilibria of a
closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategies. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 17 (1): 1-20.
[4] Dubey, P. , A. Mas-Colell and M. Shubik (1980). Efficiency properties
of strategic market games: an axiomatic approach. Journal of Economic
Theory, 22 (2): 363-76
[5] Dubey, P. and L. S. Shapley (1994). Noncooperative general exchange
with a continuum of traders. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 23:
253-293.
[6] Dubey, P. and S. Sahi (2003). Price-mediated trade with quantity sig-
nals. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Special issue on strategic mar-
ket games (in honor of Martin Shubik), ed. G. Giraud, 39: 377-389
[7] Dubey, P. and J. Geanakoplos (2003). From Nash to Walras via Shapley-
Shubik. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Special issue on strategic
market games (in honor of Martin Shubik), ed. G. Giraud, 39: 391-400
[8] Dubey, P. and J. Geanakoplos (2003). Inside and outside fiat money,
gains to trade, and IS-LM. Economic Theory, 21(2-3): 347-497.
[9] Dubey, P., S. Sahi and M. Shubik (2015) “Money as Minimal Complex-
ity”, arXiv:1512.02317
[10] Foley, D.K. (1970). Economic equilibrium with costly marketing. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 2(3): 276-91.
[11] Hahn, F. H. (1971). Equilibrium with transactions costs. Econometrica,
39 (3): 417-39.
[12] Heller, W. P. (1974). The holding of money balances in general equilib-
rium. Journal of Economic Theory, 7: 93-108.
23
[13] Heller, W.P. and R. Starr. Equilibrium with non-convex transactions
costs: monetary and non-monetary economies. Review of Economic
Studies, 43 (2): 195-215.
[14] Howitt, P. and R. Clower. (2000). The emergence of economic organiza-
tion. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 41: 55-84
[15] Iwai, K. (1996). The bootstrap theory of money: a search theoretic
foundation for monetary economics. Structural Change and Economic
Dynamics, 7: 451-77
[16] Jevons, W.S. (1875). Money and the mechanism of exchange. London:
D. Appleton
[17] Jones, R.A.(1976). The origin and development of media of exchange:
Journal of Political Economy, 84: 757-75
[18] Knapp, G.F. (1905) Staatliche Theorie des Geldes, 4th edition, Munich
and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Translated as The State Theory of
Money, London: Macmillan, 1924.
[19] Kiyotaki, N and R. Wright (1989). On money as a medium of exchange.
Journal of Political Economy, 97: 927-54
[20] Kiyotaki, N and R. Wright (1993). A search-theoretic approach to mon-
etary economics. American Economic Review, 83 (1): 63-77
[21] Kaulla, R. (1920) Grundlagen des geldwerts, Stuttgart. Translation in
Howard S. Ellis, German Monetary Theory: 1903-1933, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1934.
[22] Lerner, A. P. (1947). Money as a creature of the state. In Proceedings of
the American Economic Association, Vol 37: 312-17
[23] Li, Y. and R. Wright (1998). Government transaction policy, media of
exchange, and prices. Journal of Economic Theory, 81 (2): 290-313
[24] Mertens, J. F. (2003). The limit-price mechanism. Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics, Special issue on strategic market games (in honor
of Martin Shubik), ed. G. Giraud, 39: 433-528.
24
[25] Menger, C. (1892). On the origin of money. Economic Journal, 2: 239-
55, trans. Caroline A. Foley
[26] Ostroy, J.M. (1973). The informational efficiency of monetary exchange,
American Economic Review,63 (4): 597-610.
[27] Ostroy, J. and R. Starr. (1974). Money and the decentralization of ex-
change. Econometrica, 42: 597-610
[28] Ostroy, J. and R. Starr. (1990). The transactions role of money. In B.
Friedman and F. Hahn (eds) Handbook of Monetary Economics, New
York: Elsevier, North- Holland: 3-62.
[29] Peck, J., K. Shell and S. E. Spear (1992). The market game: existence
and structure of equilibria. Journal of Mathematical Economics
[30] Peck, J. and K. Shell (1992). Market uncertainty: correlated sunspot
equilibria in imperfectly competitive economies. The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies,1992
[31] Postlewaite, A. and D. Schmeidler (1978). Approximate efficiency of
non-Walrasian equilibria. Econometrica, 46 (1): 127-36.
[32] Sahi, S. (2013). Harmonic vectors and matrix tree theorems. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1309.4047.
[33] Sahi, S. and S. Yao. (1989). The noncooperative equilibria of a closed
trading economy with complete markets and consistent prices. Journal
of Mathematical Economics, 18: 325-346.
[34] Schumpeter, J. A. (1954). History of Economic Analysis. New York:
Oxford University Press.
[35] Shapley, L. S. (1976). Noncooperative general exchange. In Theory and
Measurement of Economic Externalities. Academc Press (ed) A. Y. Lin:
155-175.
[36] Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik (1977). Trade using one commodity as a
means of payment. Journal of Political Economy, 85: 937-968.
[37] Shubik, M. (1973). Commodity money, oligopoly, credit and bankruptcy
in a general equilibrium model. Western Economic Journal, 11: 24-38.
25
[38] Shubik, M. and C. Wilson (1977). The optimal bankruptcy rule in a
trading economy using fiat money. Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie, 37
(3-4): 337-354.
[39] Shubik, M. (1999). The theory of money and financial institutions. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
[40] Starr, R.M. (2012). Why is there money? Edward Elgar, Cheltenham,
UK & Northhampton, MA, US.
[41] Starret, D.A. (1973). Inefficiency and the demand for money in a se-
quence economy. Review of Economic Studies,40 (4): 437-48
[42] Trejos, A. and R.Wright (1995). Search, bargaining, money and prices.
Journal of Political Economy, 103(1) : 118-41.
[43] Wallace, N. (1980). The overlapping generations model of fiat money. In
J. Karaken and N. Wallace, Models of Monetary Economics, Minneapo-
lis, MN: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis: 49-82
26
